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1Evaluating the Probability of Malicious
Co-residency in Public Clouds
Paul Ezhilchelvan and Isi Mitrani
Abstract—We examine a system where servers can host several
virtual machines in parallel and where some of the users are
malicious. Arrivals and departures of both normal and malicious
users are governed by random processes. The aim is to estimate
the probability that a possible target will find itself sharing a
server with an attacker. Two allocation policies for assigning
virtual machines to servers are studied. In both cases, as well
as attacks forming part of the arrival process, multiple simul-
taneous attacks are considered. Closed-form expressions for the
desired estimates are obtained. Comparisons with simulations for
purposes of validation are presented and the effect of increasing
the number of available servers is illustrated.
Keywords: cloud security, co-location attacks, virtual ma-
chines, stochastic modeling, simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) model enables enter-
prises to purchase computing resources on-the-fly and thus
relieves them from overheads related to maintaining the re-
quired resources themselves. Cloud Infrastructure Providers
(CIPs), such as Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure, respond
to demands by multiplexing several customers’ workloads on
a single physical machine; typically, virtualization is used to
encapsulate a customer’s workload inside a virtual machine
(VM). Thus, VMs belonging to, and controlled by, different
customers can be hosted at the same server. Such co-resident
VMs also share the host’s physical resources such as CPU,
cache, local disk and network interface. Virtualization offers
advantages such as ease of deployment, economies of scale
and lower cost per customer.
However, co-residency also introduces the possibility that
VMs might interfere with each other’s information or re-
sources. Cloud Providers commonly employ hypervisors or
virtual machine monitors to accomplish strong isolation be-
tween co-resident VMs. There have been several proposals for
the effective design of such tools (e.g., see [13], [11], [4], [3]).
Nevertheless, sharing of hardware components between VMs
has repeatedly been shown to introduce vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by cross-VM side-channel attacks to gain access
to confidential information, or an enhanced performance at the
victim’s expense (see [12], [18], [2], [5], [10], [16]). The only
sure way of avoiding interference is to statically partition the
server resources between VMs (e.g., see [7], [15]), or to offer
a single-tenant service. Such approaches are inefficient and/or
expensive. Multi-tenancy provisioning is still widely offered.
Clearly, the possibility of security breaches due to mali-
cious co-resident VMs is of a serious concern to both cloud
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providers and cloud customers (see [17]). The aim of this paper
is to quantify the extent to which that concern is justified. We
formalize, and then answer, the following questions:
i. In the normal course of events, with VMs being allocated
and de-allocated as time passes according to some ran-
dom processes, and assuming that a certain fraction of
them are malicious, what is the probability that a target
will find itself sharing a server with at least one attacker?
ii. If an attacker is aware that a given target has just been
admitted in the system, and immediately launches several
simultaneous VMs, what is the probability that at least
one of them will share a server with the target?
The answers to these questions depend, of course, on the
manner in which VMs are allocated to servers. We examine
two allocation policies: (a) Random, whereby a server is
chosen with equal probability among the set of servers that
are not fully occupied; (b) Priority Blocks, where the servers
are grouped into blocks and prioritized; new VMs are allocated
to a lower priority block only when all higher priority ones
are full; within blocks, the random policy is used. This policy
would be used if power saving is an objective of the Cloud
provider. Note that when all blocks contain just one server, the
Priority Blocks policy coincides with the well-known First-Fit
policy.
We are interested only in the possibility of a co-resident
attack. Whether the attack is successful or not is a question
outside the scope of the present paper (but see the Conclusion
for a possible extension). Thus, what we evaluate can be
considered as an upper bound on the probability that the target
will actually suffer damage as a result of an attack. Another
feature of question (i) that is worth pointing out is that a
malicious VM need not join the target’s server after the target
has started running. It could already be present at the server, by
a combination of design and luck, when the target is admitted.
The fraction of malicious VMs represents the threat level
that a possible target faces. This is a model parameter which
can be varied, along with other parameters describing the load-
ing conditions. For a given parameter set, we provide closed-
form expressions for evaluating the desired probabilities.
The applications of our results have to do with the cost–
security and/or cost–performance trade-offs faced by both the
cloud providers and their customers. A provider may decide,
at a higher cost, to increase security by investing in special
protection software (e.g., see Steinburg and Kauer [14]), which
may interfere with performance, or by increasing the number
of servers (we show that the latter lowers the probability of
malicious co-residency). The customer, on the other hand, may
have the choice of using the standard multi-tenancy service,
or paying extra for a single-tenancy one.
2In order to make intelligent decisions, and to optimize
expected benefit, both the provider and the users would
need to know the probability of malicious co-residency. That
probability can also be incorporated by the provider in any
service-level agreement that focuses on security.
In a practical application, the solutions we provide would
need to be combined with traffic monitoring software that
would provide current estimates for the job arrival rate and
average residence time. The problems of parameter estimation
are not new and are quite well understood.
The tools employed in the analysis come from the fields
of stochastic processes and queueing theory. While their use
in performance engineering is well known, this is a novel
application in the area of security.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem considered here
has not been addressed before. Perhaps the closest work is
by Azar et al [1], who consider a variant of question (ii)
in the context of a static system (no processes of arrivals
and departures) with a particular VM allocation policy. Other
research has focused on demonstrating that a malicious co-
residency can verifiably be accomplished (Ristenpart et al
[12]), or has been concerned with techniques for detecting
co-residency with specific targets (Zhang et al [19], Bates
et al [2], Herzberg et al [6]). Despite action taken by the
cloud providers since the publication of [12], the possibility
of successful attack has not been eliminated.
Section 2 presents the model, analysis and results corre-
sponding to the random allocation policy. It contains a subsec-
tion that deals with the case of multiple simultaneous attacks.
Section 3 is concerned with the priority blocks policy. It
also contains a subsection dealing with multiple simultaneous
attacks. In each section, estimates relying on approximations
are validated by comparing them with simulations. Section 4
contains the conclusions and suggestions for future work.
II. RANDOM ALLOCATION POLICY
In existing clouds servers are usually divided into disjoint
sets, dedicated to different types of service. For example,
in EC2, types are defined by combinations of VM resource
requirements. Servers in a given set host only VMs of the
corresponding type. Hence, an attacker attempting to co-locate
with a target VM must make a request of the appropriate
type. This means that each set of servers can be considered in
isolation, independently of the others. Moreover, we assume
that the servers in a given set can host the same maximum
number of VMs. In EC2, that number is about 8 for VMs of
type ‘small’.
With these observations in mind, we make the following
assumptions.
A service set contains N identical servers, each of which
can run a maximum of m parallel virtual machines. Thus,
there can be at most K = Nm user jobs running at any one
time. Jobs arrive into the system in a Poisson stream at rate
λ and have residence times that are i.i.d. random variables
distributed exponentially with mean 1/µ. The offered load is
therefore ρ = λ/µ. Any incoming job that finds all virtual
machines busy (i.e., K jobs already present) is lost.
When a job is admitted into the system, it is assigned to a
server chosen at random (i.e., with equal probability) among
the set of servers where there is at least one unoccupied virtual
machine. Jobs that reside on virtual machines running on the
same server are said to ‘share’ that server. It is assumed that the
residence times do not depend on the number of jobs sharing
a server.
Some of the jobs are malicious, and may be able to inflict
damage on any job that shares a server with them. Such
jobs will be referred to as ‘attackers’. An incoming job is
an attacker with probability α, independently of past arrivals.
A job is said to be placed ‘in jeopardy’ if (a) on arrival it is
assigned to a server which contains at least one attacker, or
(b) at least one attacker arrives and is assigned to the same
server during the job’s residence in the system.
The problem is to estimate the steady-state probability, h,
that a job admitted into the system will be placed in jeopardy.
The above assumptions imply that the number of jobs in the
system behaves like an M/M/K/K queue, i.e. an Erlang loss
system with K trunks and an offered load ρ. The probability
that an incoming job is admitted is equal to 1 − B(ρ,K),
where
B(x, n) =
xn
n!
 n∑
j=0
xj
j!
−1 (1)
is the Erlang-B function (also known as Erlang loss formula;
see, for example, [9]).
Since all servers are treated equally, the steady-state rate γ
at which jobs are admitted into any given server is equal to
γ =
1
N
λ[1−B(ρ,K)] . (2)
Let qj be the probability that, at the moment when a job is
admitted into a server, it shares that server with j other jobs,
j = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1. These probabilities can be estimated by
assuming that jobs are admitted into the server in a Poisson
stream, with rate γ given by (2). In other words, during periods
when there is at least one available virtual machine, a server
is approximated by an M/M/m−1/m−1 queue with offered
load σ = γ/µ. This gives the expressions
qj =
σj
j!
[
m−1∑
i=0
σi
i!
]−1
; j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 . (3)
Consider now a target job which is admitted into a server
and finds j other jobs sharing. If at least one of those jobs
is an attacker, which occurs with probability 1 − (1 − α)j ,
then the job is in jeopardy immediately. Otherwise, with
probability (1 − α)j , the job is safe on arrival, but may be
placed in jeopardy later. Its residence in the server may then
be modelled by the Markov process whose state transition
diagram is illustrated in figure 1.
The process is in state j, j = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, if there are
j other jobs sharing the server. If j < m− 1 and an attacker
arrives, with rate αγ, then the process enters an absorbing
state, ‘hit’: the target is placed in jeopardy. If the target job
departs, with rate µ, then another absorbing state, ‘miss’, is
entered: the job escapes safely. The other transitions represent
3arrivals and departures of ordinary jobs. State m − 1 can be
left only as a result of a departure.
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Fig. 1. Residence of a target job
Denote by hj the probability that the process will be
absorbed in state ‘hit’, given that it is currently in state j,
i.e. the target job shares the server with j other jobs, none of
which is an attacker (j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1). If j < m− 1, then
the next event to occur is one of the following:
(a) arrival of an attacker, with probability
αγ
γ + (j + 1)µ
.
The target will then be in jeopardy.
(b) arrival of a normal job, with probability
(1− α)γ
γ + (j + 1)µ
.
The process will then be in state j + 1.
(c) departure of one of the other jobs, with probability
jµ
γ + (j + 1)µ
.
The process will then be in state j − 1.
(d) departure of the target, with probability
µ
γ + (j + 1)µ
.
The process is absorbed in state ‘miss’.
If j = m− 1, all virtual machines are busy and no new jobs
can be admitted. Then the only possible transitions are to state
m− 2, with probability (m− 1)/m, or to a safe completion,
with probability 1/m.
Note that, dividing numerator and denominator by µ leads
to expressions for the above probabilities that depend only on
the offered load, σ = γ/µ, rather than on γ and µ individually.
We can now write the following equations for the probabil-
ities hj . When j < m− 1 we have
hj =
ασ
σ + j + 1
+
(1− α)σ
σ + j + 1
hj+1 +
j
σ + j + 1
hj−1 , (4)
and when j = m− 1,
hm−1 =
m− 1
m
hm−2 . (5)
These equations allow hj to be determined easily. The un-
conditional probability, h, that a target job will be placed in
jeopardy, is then equal to
h =
m−1∑
j=0
[1− (1− α)j + (1− α)jhj ]qj , (6)
with qj given by (3).
It is perhaps worth mentioning that equations (1), (2) and
(3) remain valid when the residence times have a general
distribution with mean 1/µ. Equations (4) and (5) require
exponentially distributed residence times, but they can still
be used as approximations when that assumption is violated.
In figure 2, the estimates provided by equation (6) are
compared with those obtained from simulations. The system
examined has 100 servers, each running 5 virtual machines,
for a total capacity of 500 virtual machines. 10% of all
jobs are attackers. The same interarrival and service time
distributions that were assumed in the model were also used in
the simulation. Thus, what the simulation tested was the extent
to which the non-Poisson nature of arrivals into a server affects
the jeopardy probability.
Each simulated point is obtained from a simulation run
covering 200000 admitted jobs. The time unit is taken as
the average residence time, that is 1/µ = 1. The jeopardy
probability is plotted against the offered load (i.e. the job
arrival rate). The latter varies between 50 and 400, making
the system occupancy vary between 10% and 80%.
Note that, for all of the above parameters, the vast majority
of the incoming jobs are admitted. Even in the most heavily
loaded case, when ρ = 400 and 80% of the virtual machines
are busy, the probability of rejecting a job, B(400,500), is on
the order of 10−7.
The figure shows that the Poisson approximation of arrivals
into a server is very acceptable. The differences between the
estimated and simulated jeopardy probabilities are on the order
of 10% or less, over the whole range of offered loads.
It is intuitively clear that when servers are allocated at
random, the more servers are available, the less likely it is
that a target job will be placed in jeopardy. To quantify this
remark, figure 3 shows the dependency of the probability h
on the number of servers, N . The offered load is fixed at two
levels, ρ = 400 and ρ = 200, while N varies from 100 to
500 servers. The number of virtual machines per server and
the fraction of attackers are m = 5 and α = 0.1, as before.
Thus, the virtual machine occupancy varies from 80% to 16%
when ρ = 400, and from 20% to 8% when ρ = 200. Both
the model estimates and the simulated ones (based on 200000
jobs admitted for each N ) are plotted.
The figure confirms our intuition that the jeopardy probabil-
ity decreases with N . Moreover, it is clear that the higher the
offered load, the longer it takes for that probability to approach
0.
Another observation that can be made in this context is
that when the offered load is low, compared to the number
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Fig. 2. Modelled and simulated probabilities: random allocation
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m = 5, α = 0.1
of servers, the model estimate of h tends to become more
accurate. This effect, which manifests itself quite slowly, is
due to the fact that incoming jobs are less frequently having
to be redirected to other servers because their first choice is
full. Hence, the admissions of jobs into any given server are
more closely approximated by a Poisson process.
A. Isolated multiple attacks
Consider a situation where a particular target job has just
entered the system and has been assigned to a server. An
attacker has somehow learned that the job is running and
decides to attack it immediately, by submitting simultaneously
` independent requests for virtual machines. This attack is an
isolated occurrence; it is not part of the arrival stream and is
assumed not to affect the long-term offered load.
Denote by r` the probability that the target is placed in
jeopardy as a result of the `-fold attack, i.e. at least one of the
attacker’s ` jobs is assigned to the same server as the target.
This probability can be estimated by arguing as follows.
Let vt be the probability that exactly t of the ` attacking jobs
are admitted into the system (t = 0, 1, . . . , `). For t < `, that is
the Erlang probability that exactly K− 1− t virtual machines
5were occupied just before the target job was admitted:
vt =
ρK−1−t
(K − 1− t)!
[
K∑
i=0
ρi
i!
]−1
; t = 0, 1, . . . , `− 1 . (7)
Then v`, which is the probability that at most K−1−` virtual
machines were occupied, is given by
v` = 1−
`−1∑
t=0
vt . (8)
Think of the job assignment mechanism as first choosing
a server at random; then, if all its virtual machines are busy,
choose another server at random; etc. Using that mechanism,
if t attacking jobs are admitted into the system, each of them
is first directed to the target server with probability 1/N . The
probability that at least one of them is first directed to the
target server is equal to 1− (1− 1/N)t.
The server will accept a new job if it is not full, i.e. if the
target job shares it with fewer than m − 1 other jobs. The
probability of that event is 1 − qm−1 = 1 − B(σ,m − 1), as
in equation (3). Hence, the probability r` is given by
r` = [1−B(σ,m− 1)]
∑`
t=0
[
1−
(
N − 1
N
)t]
vt . (9)
Note that the term 1 − B(σ,m − 1) places an upper bound
on the probability r`. No matter how many attacking jobs
are submitted simultaneously, the jeopardy probability cannot
exceed that value.
III. PRIORITY BLOCKS
Suppose now that the random assignment of jobs to avail-
able servers is replaced by a priority allocation. More pre-
cisely, the N servers are divided into S groups, numbered
1, 2, . . . , S. Group i contains Ni servers, hence a total of
ki = Nim virtual machines. Servers in group i have priority
over those in group i + 1, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , S − 1. In
other words, an incoming job would be assigned to a server
in group i+1 only if all virtual machines in groups 1, 2, . . . , i
are occupied. Within each group, a server is chosen at random
among those with available virtual machines.
Note that, in the extreme case when the number of groups
is N and each group contains just one server, the above policy
becomes what is known as the ‘First-Fit’ policy: the servers
are numbered from 1 to N and each incoming job is allocated
to the server with a lowest index that has an available virtual
machine.
A possible reason for implementing such a priority alloca-
tion policy would be to minimize energy consumption. Groups
of servers could be powered down when not needed. However,
our interest is in finding out what effect, if any, this policy has
on the probability h of a job being placed in jeopardy, given
that it has been admitted into the system. The assumptions
concerning job arrivals, fraction of attackers and residence in
the system are as before.
Denote by Ki the total number of virtual machines in groups
1, 2, . . . , i: Ki = k1 + k2 + . . . + ki. The probability that all
those machines are occupied is given by the Erlang-B function
in equation (1), B(ρ,Ki), with ρ = λ/µ being the offered
load.
Let pi be the probability that an incoming job is admitted
into a server in group i. For i = 1 that is the probability that
there is an available virtual machine in group 1, while for i > 1
it is the probability that all machines in groups 1, 2, . . . , i− 1
are occupied, but there is an available one in group i. Hence,
p1 = 1−B(ρ,K1) ;
pi = B(ρ,Ki−1)−B(ρ,Ki) ; i = 2, 3, . . . , S . (10)
Since all servers within a group are treated equally, the steady-
state rate at which jobs are admitted into a given server in
group i is
γi =
λpi
Ni
; i = 1, 2, . . . , S . (11)
Now one can apply the approximations (3), with offered
load σi = γi/µ, to estimate the probabilities, qi,j , that a job
admitted into a server in group i will find itself sharing that
server with j other jobs. A similar argument to that leading to
(4) and (5) provides expressions for the probabilities, hi,j , that
a job admitted into a server in group i and finding j other jobs
there, none of which is an attacker, will be placed in jeopardy.
Then, equation (6), with hj and qj replaced by hi,j and qi,j
respectively, gives the probability, hi, that a job admitted into
a server in group i will be placed in jeopardy.
Finally, the unconditional steady-state probability, h, that a
job admitted into the system will be placed in jeopardy, is
estimated as
h =
1
1−B(ρ,KS)
S∑
i=1
hipi . (12)
The denominator in the right-hand side of (12) is the proba-
bility that an incoming job is admitted.
Figure 4 illustrates the modelled and simulated probabilities
h for the same parameters as in figure 2, except that the 100
servers are divided into four groups of 25 servers each, and a
priority assignment policy is used.
The jeopardy probabilities now tend to be higher than in
the random assignment case, because the offered load tends
to be distributed among fewer servers. However, the agreement
between modelled and simulated values is again on the order
of 10% or less.
A notable feature of this figure is that, in both model and
simulation, the probability h is not a monotone function of the
offered load. It seems that the reason for that non-monotonicity
lies in the complex interplay between three trends: on one
hand, a higher offered load implies a higher arrival rate of
attackers. On the other hand, a higher offered load causes more
servers to be used. Also, a job which shares a server with m−1
other jobs is protected from attack (because new arrivals are
not admitted), and that happens more frequently in the present
system.
As with the random assignment of jobs to servers, it is
reasonable to ask what happens when the number of servers
increases. The answer is less clear-cut in the present case. In
figure 5, the number of groups is kept fixed at S = 4, while
the number of servers per group increases from 25 to 125.
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The jeopardy probability is evaluated for two different offered
loads, ρ = 400 and ρ = 200.
There is a general tendency for the jeopardy probability
to decrease, but that decrease is not always monotone. In
particular, when the offered load is 400, increasing the number
of servers per group from 75 to 100 causes a slight increase
in the value of h. This is due to the way the servers are used:
when there are 375 virtual machines per group, the first group
is not enough to cope with the load and the second group
is frequently brought into play; when there are 500 virtual
machines per group, the first group can cope and the second
group is hardly used; fewer servers are active, on the average,
and their utilization is a little higher.
When the offered load is 200 and the group size becomes 50
(i.e., 250 virtual machines), the first group alone can cope with
the load. Further increases in its size lead to lower jeopardy
probability as in the case of random assignment.
If the total number of servers is increased, not by increasing
the number of servers per group, but by keeping that number
fixed and increasing the number of groups, then a different
behaviour would be observed. After a certain point, the jeop-
ardy probability would remain constant. Once there are enough
groups so that their servers can cope with the offered load,
adding more lower priority groups would not change anything
7very much since those servers would stay largely unused. This
remark applies, in particular, to the First-Fit allocation policy.
A. Isolated multiple attacks
In the context of priority server allocation, one can again
imagine an isolated attack on a specific target by ` simulta-
neous submissions. To estimate the probability of placing the
target in jeopardy, we adapt the argument in subsection II-A
to the model with groups of servers and priorities.
Suppose that the target has joined a server in group i, having
found all servers in groups 1, 2, . . . , i−1 fully occupied. This
happens with probability pi, given by equation (10). Since the
attackers are submitted at the same time, they are also directed
to servers of priority i or lower. Let vi,t be the probability
that exactly t of the ` attacking jobs are admitted into group i
(t = 0, 1, . . . , `). These probabilities are given by expressions
similar to equations (7) and (8):
vi,t =
ρKi−1−ti
(Ki − 1− t)!
 Ki∑
j=0
ρji
j!
−1 ; t = 0, 1, . . . , `− 1 ,
(13)
vi,` = 1−
`−1∑
t=0
vi,t , (14)
where ρi = λpi and Ki = Nim are the offered load and the
number of virtual machines in group i, respectively.
If t of the attackers are admitted into group i, then the
probability that at least one of them is directed to the same
server as the target is 1− [(Ni−1)/Ni]t. That attacker will be
admitted into the server if the target shares it with fewer than
m−1 other jobs. The probability of that event is 1−qi,m−1 =
1−B(σi,m− 1), with σi = λpi/(Niµ), as in equation (3).
Hence, the probability ri,`, that the target will be placed in
jeopardy as a result of an `-fold attack, given that it has joined
group i, is given by
ri,` = [1−B(σi,m− 1)]
∑`
t=0
[
1−
(
Ni − 1
Ni
)t]
vi,t . (15)
The unconditional probability, h`, of achieving jeopardy
with ` simultaneous attacks, is obtained as in (12):
h` =
1
1−B(ρ,KS)
S∑
i=1
ri,`pi . (16)
Again, the factors 1−B(σi,m− 1) place an upper bound on
the jeopardy probability.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem of assessing the likelihood
of malicious co-residency in public clouds. Closed-form ex-
pressions have been obtained which allow the desired probabil-
ities to be evaluated simply and efficiently. On the basis of the
experiments conducted, the accuracy of the estimates appears
to be acceptable. However, more extensive simulations, and
possibly real life experiments, would be required in order to
see whether that accuracy remains acceptable when either the
arrivals are not Poisson, or the VM residence times are not
distributed exponentially, or both.
One may be interested in the probability, h′ that a target
suffers actual damage as a result of malicious co-residency.
Assuming that the success probability, β, for a co-resident
attack is known, is independent of the length of time the target
remains in the system, and neglecting the possibility of more
than one attack on the same target, h′ can be approximated by
βh. If that last possibility cannot be neglected, then a more
complicated analysis would be needed in order to determine,
not just the probability of at least one malicious co-residency,
but also the distribution of the number of malicious co-
residencies. The question would also arise whether the success
of one attack is independent of the success or failure of
another.
There are other algorithms for allocating VMs to servers
that might be considered (see [8] et al). These include least-
full first, most-full first and next-fit (whereby the list of servers
is traversed cyclically). The last of these is likely to have
a similar behaviour to the random policy, but the other two
would be non-trivial to analyze since they introduce rather
complex state-dependencies.
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